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Japanese	Law	Goes	Pop	
Leon Wolff1 
 
 
Abstract: This article explores the extent to which the growth in law-themed popular culture, 
especially television shows, since the turn of the century signals a shift in popular attitudes towards 
law. Four decades of research into Japanese legal consciousness has interrogated the extent to which 
there is a Japanese cultural aversion to law with most scholars expressing doubt over whether culture 
properly explains comparatively low litigation rates in Japan compared to other industrialised 
nations. This article argues that popular culture, although not without its limitations, offers new clues 
into how legal consciousness is developing and changing in 21st century Japan. The article concludes 
that popular culture paints a picture of a greater preparedness by Japanese people to engage with 
law, although scepticism remains about law’s promise to achieve justice and social solidarity.  
 
Keywords: Japanese law; litigiousness; popular culture   
 
*** 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Is Japanese law going “pop”?2 Since the turn of the century, Japanese prime-time television is 
dedicating more time to legal themes and characters. Lawyers, overwhelmingly women, are 
figuring more prominently as heroes in both dramatic and comedic television series;3 court-
                                                            
1 Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Bond University. Co-director, Australian Network for Japanese Law, and 
Deputy Director, Centre for Law, Governance and Public Policy.  
2 Richard K Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2000. This 
article borrows from Sherwin’s evocative book title, using “pop” to indicate both “popular culture” and 
“explosion” – that is, the noticeably greater interest in law by Japanese creative industries, especially the 
television industry). Sherwin himself, however, was more concerned with the opposite trend – the influence of 
popular culture on American legal practice and its resulting corrosive impact on the legitimacy and authority of 
law.  
3 Hisao Nakamura, “Dorama ‘Shimane no Bengoshi’”, Jiyu to Seigi, Vol. 58, No. 7, July 2007, pp. 6-7. 
  2
room battles are featuring as the setting for plot developments;4 and practising lawyers are 
becoming the new celebrities on light-entertainment talk-shows. For example, in 2005-2007, 
network television screened at least six series about the professional and personal lives of 
lawyers: “Bengoshi no Kuzu” (“Trash Lawyers”) (TBS, 2006), “Rikon Bengoshi II” 
(“Divorce Lawyer” (Fuji Television, 2005), “Machiben” (“Small Town Lawyer”) (NHK, 
2006), “Shichinin no Onna Bengoshi” (“Seven Female Lawyers”) (TV Asahi, 2006), 
“Watashitachi no Kyoukasho” (“My Textbook”) (Fuji Television, 2007) and “Shimane no 
Bengoshi” (“The Lawyer in Shimane”) (NHK, 2007).5 Other recent television series, 
although not set in law offices such as the 2004 medical drama “Shiroi Kyouto” (“The Tall 
White Tower”) (Fuji Television), nonetheless deployed courtroom scenes for dramatic 
effect.6 Even non-scripted television is invoking law for entertainment value. Consider, for 
example, the talk shows “Za Jajji” (“The Judge”) (Fuji Television, 2001-2004) and 
“Gyouretsu no Dekiru Houristsu Soudansho” (“The Law Firm with the Long Queue”) (Nihon 
Television, 2002-current), both featuring lawyers who give legal advice on, respectively, 
actual or fictional cases.   
 
All this is not to suggest that law is an entirely new thematic preoccupation in Japanese 
prime-time television, or that it is saturating the airwaves to the exclusion of more 
conventional work-place romantic comedies, coming-of-age stories or family sagas. For 
example, “Shichinin no Onna Bengoshi” (“Seven Female Lawyers”), which has screened two 
series this century (Asahi Television, 2006 and 2008), is a re-make of a 1990s show which 
screened three series (winter 1991, autumn 1991 and 1993) and a two-hour special (1997). 
Similarly, between April and October 1996, the government broadcaster NHK screened 
                                                            
4 Hiroshi Ishikawa, “Dorama ‘Shiroi Kyoutou’ ni Torikunde”, Jiyu to Seigi, Vol. 55 No. 9, September 2004, pp. 
5-7. 
5 Nakamura, “Dorama …”, p. 6.  
6 Ishikawa, “Dorama …”, pp. 5-7.  
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“Himawari” (“Sunflower”), its morning drama serial in the 8:15am - 8:30am Monday to 
Saturday time-slot about a law student who passes the bar examination and enters the 
Practical Legal Training Institute.7 Equally, the growth in law-themed television shows in 
Japan in the last decade is not approximating the levels observable in the United States where 
“lawyers and the like are over-represented occupations on prime-time TV.”8  
 
But a trend towards a greater embrace of law by Japanese popular culture, especially network 
television, is discernible – if not a tsunami, then at least a strong under-current. And this 
merits analysis. As Carillo has argued, it is not enough to merely identify that there is a link 
between law and popular culture; scholars need to explain how that link operates in law and 
society.9 Such is the purpose of this article – to explore the socio-legal significance of this 
newfound fascination with the legal players, institutions and processes by the television 
industry in Japan. In particular, this article investigates whether the silver screen’s 
burgeoning appetite for law indicates a broader shift towards a more favourable outlook 
about law and litigation among the general population.  
 
By deploying popular culture to explicate Japanese legal consciousness, this article applies a 
novel analytical method to a long-standing research question in the socio-legal and 
comparative law literature on Japan. For over 40 years, scholars have debated the extent to 
which law matters in Japan. Deploying a wide range of empirical approaches and analytical 
                                                            
7 Anonymous, “Heroin-wa Bengoshi no Tamago”, Hougaku Seminaa, Volume 494, 1996, p. 127.  
8 Anthony Chase, “Lawyers and Popular Culture: A Review of Mass Media Portrayals of American Attorneys”, 
American Bar Foundation Research Journal, Volume 28, 1986, p. 281. For a more recent and comprehensive 
review of the corpus of law-related film and television series in the United States, see Naomi Mezey and Mark 
C. Niles, “Screening the Law: Ideology and Law in American Popular Culture”, Colombia Journal of Law & 
Arts, Vol. 28, 1986, pp. 91-186. Even compared to other western nations, the United States has a particularly 
acute pre-occupation with law in popular culture. For example, in one survey of 190 films featuring courtroom 
scenes, 135 were American whereas 34 were English and seven were Australian: see Kathy Laster with Krista 
Breckweg and John King, The Drama of the Courtroom, Sydney, Federation Press, 2000.   
9 Jo Carrillo, “Links and Choices: Popular Legal Culture in the Work of Lawrence M. Friedman”, Southern 
California Interdisciplinary Law Journal, Vol. 17, 2011, p. 3.  
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techniques, including institutional history,10 rational choice theory and regression analysis,11 
ethnography,12 narrative analysis,13 communitarianism14 and neo-institutionalism,15 
successive generations of Japanese and non-Japanese experts, both in law and in other 
disciplines, have sought to explain whether or not – and, if so, how – legal rules, legal 
processes, legal professionals and legal actors play important roles in structuring and ordering 
society. This study is the first in the literature to address – or, more precisely, re-visit – the 
same question using popular culture as both a source of data (specifically, television shows) 
and as a research method (namely, a narrative analysis of the themes and concerns in these 
media texts).  
 
This novelty carries real risks. In both the disciplines of Japanese Studies16 and Law,17 
popular culture remains on the margins of scholarship. In Japanese Studies, for example, the 
bulk of scholarly interest, at least until the lost decade of economic stagnation in the 1990s, 
was on Japan’s “hard” power: its economic might in the production and export of cars, 
electronics and other manufactured products.18 In Law, “huge portions of legal scholarship … 
are devoted to the routine tasks of lawyers,”19 premised on the assumption that law is a closed 
                                                            
10 John Owen Haley, The Spirit of Japanese Law, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1998. 
11 J Mark Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato, Japanese Law: An Economic Approach, Boston, University of 
Chicago Press, 1999.  
12 David T Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan, Oxford and New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2002. 
13 Catherine Burns, Sexual Violence and the Law in Japan, London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2005.  
14 Takao Tanase (translated by Luke Nottage and Leon Wolff), Community and the Law: A Critical 
Reassessment of American Liberalism and Japanese Modernity, Cheltenham and Northampton, Edward Elgar, 
2010.  
15 Mark West, Law in Everyday Japan: Sex, Sumo, Suicide, and Statute, Boston, University of Chicago Press, 
2005.  
16 Matthew Allen and Rumi Sakamoto, “Introduction: Inside-out Japan? Popular Culture and Globalization in 
the Context of Japan”:  in Popular Culture, Globalization and Japan, Matthew Allen and Rumi Sakamoto (eds),  
London and New York, Rouledge, 2006, p. 4; Tim Craig, “Introduction” in: Japan Pop! Inside the World of 
Japanese Popular Culture, Timothy J. Craig (ed), Armonk, New York and London, ME Sharp, 2000, p. 5.  
17 Carillo, “Links and Choices …”, pp. 1-3; Steve Greenfield and Guy Osborn, “Law, Legal Education and 
Popular Culture” in: Readings in Law and Popular Culture, Steve Greenfield and Guy Osborn (eds), London 
and New York, Routledge, 2006, pp. 1-12.  
18 Craig, “Introduction …”, p. 5.  
19 Richard A. Epstein, “Let ‘The Fundamental Things Apply’: Necessary and Contingent Truths in Legal 
Scholarship”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 115, 2002, p. 1288. 
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system of formal rules20 with an “immanent rationality”21 and its own “structure, substantive 
content, procedure and tradition.”22 Where law and popular culture do collide, at best, 
popular culture gets the law wrong;23 at worst, it corrodes the legitimacy of law with its 
alternative “gratifying-based” logic that undermines the finality of judgement and the ability 
to pursue justice.24   
 
These concerns, however, are relatively easy to address. First, the collapse in Japan’s “hard” 
economic prowess has shifted attention towards Japan’s “soft” cultural capital. Karaoke is 
now enjoyed world-wide; anime, such as the films of Hayao Miyazaki, are screened globally; 
character brands, such as Hello Kitty and Pokemon, are universally familiar; video games 
such as Street Fighter are played on Sony Play-Stations or Nintendo devices in living rooms 
everywhere; Japanese pop-songs and television dramas attract fans from across East Asia; 
and manga are read in translation the world over.25 Japanese Studies scholars are beginning to 
take these trends seriously. Indeed, some are even advocating that the growing appeal of 
Japan’s cultural products should serve a geopolitical purpose, underpinning Japan’s regional 
diplomacy26 and securing its continued relevance in international affairs.27 Second, more and 
more legal scholars are exploring law in its social context. As Dershowitz puts it, “[l]aw 
without context is rules without meaning:”28  
                                                            
20 Ian Duncanson, “Degrees of Law: Interdisciplinarity in the Law Discipline”, Griffith Law Review, Vol. 5, 
1996, pp. 78-9.  
21 W. Bradley Wendell, “Explanation in Legal Scholarship: The Inferential Structure of Doctrinal Legal 
Analysis”, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 96, 2011, p. 1073. 
22 Alan M. Dershowitz, “The Interdisciplinary Study of Law: A Dedicatory Note on the Founding of the NILR”, 
Northwestern Interdisciplinary Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2008, p. 4. 
23 Carillo, “Links and Voices …”, p. 1.  
24 Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop, p. 12.  
25 Allen and Sakamoto, “Introduction …”, p. 2; Craig, “Introduction …”, pp. 4-5. 
26 Kazuo Ogura, “Kokusai-zai no Shin no Kachi Kousou Sekai ni Hasshin Shoo”, Vol. 1261, October 2004, pp. 
210-17. 
27 Tamotsu Aoki, “Kuuru Pawaa Kokka Nihon no Souzou o!”, Chuuou Kouron, Vol. 1261, October 2004, pp. 
198-209.   
28 Dershowitz, “The Interdisciplinary Study of Law …”, p. 4 
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Law, by its very nature, must be interdisciplinary. It is impossible to understand a legal 
system without recourse to history, psychology, economics, philosophy, and other academic 
disciplines. Law provides the structure for decision-making, but the structure is dependent on 
substantive rules that reflect the deeper concerns of a society. It has long been debated 
whether the structure of law implicitly contains values or whether these values come entirely 
from the substantive laws. Whichever view one takes on this matter, the importance of 
disciplines outside of the law cannot be over-stated.29 
At any rate, even if the wider discipline of law is still engaged in a tug-of-war between 
advocates of doctrinal and socio-legal research orientations,30 the Japanese law research 
community overwhelmingly accepts (and engages in) contextual scholarship. After all, the 
question of litigiousness — or the “fondness” for law31 — is a socio-cultural question: it 
concerns a society’s appetite for law; its preparedness to invoke formal law to articulate 
claims, defend rights and resolve disputes. As such, it is a socio-legal, not a doctrinal, issue. 
 
The potential methodological and theoretical risks of using Japanese popular culture to 
excavate possible attitudinal changes towards law in Japan, however, present deeper 
challenges. The methodological problem involves using works of fiction to investigate socio-
legal reality. The theoretical problem revolves around resurrecting culture as an explanatory 
variable in Japanese law and society when decades of socio-legal research have discounted, 
or at expressed reservations over, its explanatory significance. These challenges merit more 
nuanced responses.  
 
                                                            
29 Ibid, p. 3.  
30 Michael Salter and Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction to the Conduct of Legal 
Research, Harlow, Pearson Education, 2007, pp. 35-7.  
31 Kenneth Hayne, “Restricting Litigiousness”, Australian Law Journal, Vol. 78, 2004, p. 381. 
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First, this article contends that popular culture is a witness to trends in a society; it is a 
window, however, not a mirror.32 Although primarily works of imagination which engage the 
aesthetic and emotional senses of the audience,33 they are only consumed if they resonate 
with the general population. It is this verisimilitude34 – or truth-like quality – that strongly 
suggests that popular culture, as sub-art, parallels developments in society35 and thereby 
offers clues to mass mentality in a society.36  
 
Second, this article shares concerns about rehabilitating cultural arguments about a peculiarly 
Japanese aversion to law.37 Proponents of a cultural theory of Japanese litigiousness depict 
Japanese society as inherently communitarian, privileging the group over the individual and 
concrete social relations over abstract individual rights. This outlook is attributable to Japan’s 
long history of geographic isolation, its ethnic homogeneity and its religious thought.38 Some 
champion this as ensuring a more socially cohesive and humane alternative to the Western-
style obsession for aggressive rights-assertion;39 others censure it for its pre-modernity40 and 
illiberalism.41 Critics, however, dismiss this cultural explanation as perpetuating a “persistent 
                                                            
32 Michael Asimov and Shannon Mader, Law and Popular Culture: A Course Book, New York, Peter Lang, 
2004, p. 6; Friedman, Lawrence, “Law, Lawyers and Popular Culture”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 98, 1989, pp. 
1587-88.  
33 Asimov and Mader, Law and Popular Culture …, pp. 11-12.  
34 Ibidem.  
35 Friedman, “Law, Lawyers and Popular Culture”, p. 1589.  
36 Allen and Sakamoto, “Introduction …”, p. 4.  
37 Kenneth L Port, “The Case for Teaching Japanese Law at American Law Schools”, Depaul Law Review, Vol. 
43, 1994, pp. 659-670. 
38 Chin Kim and Craig M. Lawson, “The Law of the Subtle Mind: The Traditional Japanese Conception of 
Law”, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 28, 1979, p. 461. 
39 Tanase, Community and the Law… 
40 Takeyoshi Kawashima, “Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan”, in: Law in Japan: The Legal Order in a 
Changing Society, Arthur von Mehren (ed), Harvard University Press, 1963, p. 41. 
41 Tatsuo Inoue, “The Poverty of Rights-Blind Communality: Looking Through the Window of Japan”, 1993, 
Brigham Young University Law Review, p. 517. 
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myth”.42 Rightly, they criticise cultural explanations for stereo-typing,43 essentialising44 and 
time-locking45 Japanese culture to its religious, historical and geographical conditions.  
 
This article, however, does not seek to re-introduce culture – that is, “the universe of 
knowledge, behaviors, beliefs, and attitudes that circulate in a particular society”46 – through 
the back door. Instead, it seeks to engage with Japanese popular culture to uncover the range 
of Japanese emotions, rather than Japanese normative perspectives, about the law. These 
emotions, this article contends, are complex, contradictory and fluid; yet an analysis of 
popular culture can discern some patterns among the diversity. And emotions matter. Despite 
the tendency in Western jurisprudence to dichotomise law and emotion,47  Alfred North 
Whitehead, as far back as 1954, had the foresight to question this false divide. “Intellect is to 
emotion as our clothes are to our body; we could not very well have a civilised life without 
clothes, but we would be in a poor way if we had only clothes without bodies.”48 In his work 
on emotional organisations, Fineman builds on this crucial insight. 49  “There are bland 
portraits of organizations,”50 he writes, in what could easily apply to most positivist accounts 
of law. Just as study of workplaces focus on governance structures, hierarchies, resources and 
processes, law, too, focuses on substantive rules, procedures and outcomes. In organisational 
                                                            
42 Veronica L, Taylor, “Continuing Transactions and Persistent Myths: Contracts in Contemporary Japan”, 
Melbourne University Law Review, Vol. 19, 1993, pp. 352, 355, 357-8. See also John O Haley, “The Myth of 
the Reluctant Litigant”, Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 4, 1978, p. 359.   
43 James K. Sebenius, “Caveats for Cross-Border Negotiators”, Negotiation Journal, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2002, p. 
121. 
44 Allen and Sakamoto, “Introduction …”, p. 5.  
45 Robert J. Janosik, “Rethinking the Culture-Negotiation Link”, (1987) Negotiation Journal, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1987, 
p. 385. 
46 Asimov and Mader, Law and Popular Culture …, pp. 3. 
47 In a literature too voluminous to cite, critical theorists — from feminists and critical race scholars to 
postmodernists — have sharply rebuked law’s claims to neutrality and objectivity. The criticism is that this 
cloaks the law in a false universality when, in fact, it privileges the interests and world-view of dominant groups 
in society. See, eg, Rosemary J Coombe, “Context, Tradition, and Convention: The Politics of Constructing 
Legal Cultures”, APLA Newsletter, Vol. 13, 1990, p. 15.  
48 Lucien Price, Dalogues with Alfred North Whitehead, Little Brown and Company, 1954, p. 231.  
49 Stephen Fineman, Understanding Emotion at Work, Sage, 1993.  
50 Ibid, p. 1. 
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theory, real people are abstracted (‘human resources’, ‘human capital’); they are boxed and 
categorised into ‘variables’; and they are subsumed under larger categories such as entities, 
firms, production and profits. 51  So, too, law re-casts people into ‘parties’ to legal 
relationships; structures human interactions into ‘issues’ or ‘problems’; and subjugates 
individuals under larger legal concerns such as  ‘the rule of law’ and ‘interests of justice’. 
This impoverishes understanding. After all, just as the workplace is a site rich with 
emotions,52 so too is the law.  
Finally, the time is ripe to re-open the debate about litigiousness in Japan. And fresh tools are 
needed to breathe new life into the scholarly conversation. Commentators are noting that 
litigation rates are recently changing. Government reforms to the civil justice system are 
investing more legal capacity in the system with the introduction of post-graduate legal 
education and more generous pass rates to ensure more lawyers can serve the legal needs of 
business and the community. Large commercial law firms are taking root in large urban 
centres. Administrative law statutes have tightened procedural rules; public participation in 
the criminal justice system is entrenched with a new system of lay judges; and a new 
corporate law code has been drafted. The Japanese government proclaims this as the 
‘legalization’ of Japanese society.53 Scholars nod their agreement. Not only does law 
“matter”, they now write; it matters “even more”.54 But why? Is it because of the 
‘Americanisation’ of Japanese society?55 Institutional reform to legal institutions as a result 
                                                            
51 Ibidem. 
52 Ibid, pp. 1-2. 
53 Justice System Reform Council, “Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council: For a Justice 
System to Support Japan in the 21st Century” (2001) (available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html).  
54 Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, “The Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical Analysis of Japan’s Turn to 
Litigation”, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 35, 2006, p. 31; R Daniel Keleman and Eric C Sibbitt, “The 
Americanization of Japanese Law”, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 23, 
2002, p. 269; Curtis Milhaupt and Mark West, “Law’s Dominion and the Market for Legal Elites in Japan”, Law 
and Policy in International Business, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2003, p. 451.  
55 Keleman and Sibbitt, “The Americanization of Japanese Law”, p. 269.  
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of government policy?56 The collapse of community and the ideological turn to liberal law?57 
There is no consensus.  
 
This article argues that a historical survey of popular culture about law in Japan evinces clear 
evidence of a growing popular interest in law. From portrayals of lawyers and the legal 
system that were sharply negative in the late 20th century, the narrative has significantly 
warmed. In the 21st century, the law is depicted as central, not marginal, to everyday life; a 
career as a lawyer is painted as a worthy, even a transformational, career destination; and 
litigation is seen as an effective way to correct injustice. At the same time, there is a 
noticeable counter-narrative that expresses reservations about the possibility of law to 
achieve justice and re-asserts the power of common sense over formal rights as the preferred 
means to repair fractured relationships. All this points to a measured embrace of law in Japan 
– one that welcomes the role of formal law to eradicate social injustice but also a healthy 
scepticism that law should not necessarily be the first point of call in a dispute.  
 
THE LITIGIOUSNESS DEBATE 
 
The issue of Japanese litigiousness commands a significant corpus of comparative and socio-
legal research attention. This is usually alongside the equally voluminous scholarship on legal 
consciousness in the United States,58 no doubt because the conventional wisdom is that Japan 
and the United States represent the opposite extreme ends of the litigiousness scale. Thus, 
America represents excessive legalism:59 “too much law, too many lawyers, and too little 
                                                            
56 Ginsburg and Hoetker, “The Unreluctant Litigant? ….”, p. 31.  
57 Tanase, Community and the Law… 
58 Eric Feldman, The Ritual of Rights in Japan: Law, Society, and Health Policy, Cambridge University Press, 
2000, pp.1-15. 
59 Deborah L Rhode, “Legal Scholarship”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 155, pp. 1327, 1350. 
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justice”60 —a “law-drenched” society61 where litigation is an “epidemic of bubonic plague 
proportions;”62 where citizens are “gorged” on rights;63 and where the impulse to sue is the 
new “secular religion”. The story on Japan is the opposite: The Japanese are “reluctant” to 
sue;64 ambivalent about rights because of their ‘Western’ roots;65 prefer informal resolution 
of their disputes;66 and, “in a word, do not like law.”67 Despite significant criticism, 68 these 
impressions endure. (By contrast, research on litigiousness in other countries is relatively 
slim. The question of Australian litigiousness, for example, despite a surge of attention69 at 
the turn of the century, when tort law reform was high on the political agenda across the 
country, has not endured as a site of scholarly enquiry.70) 
 
Litigiousness has important policy implications. After all, litigiousness — or a society’s 
willingness71 to embrace the law to assert rights and resolve disputes72 — raises important 
                                                            
60 Ibid, p. 1348. 
61 Jethro Lieberman, The Litigious Society, Basic Books, 1981, p. xi.  
62 Paul W McCracken, “The Big Domestic Issues: Slow Growth”, Wall St Journal, 4 October 1991, p. A14. 
63 Feldman, The Ritual of Rights in Japan, p. 2. 
64 Kawashima, “Dispute Resolution …”, p. 41. 
65 Kim  and Lawson, “The Law of the Subtle Mind …”, p. 461. 
66 Port, “The Case for Teaching Japanese Law …”, pp. 659-670. 
67 Yoshiyuki Noda, Introduction to Japanese Law (Anthony H Angelo trans), University of Tokyo Press, 1976, 
p. 160. 
68 For criticisms of excessive legalism in the United States, see Marc Galanter, “Real World Torts: An Antidote 
to Anecdote” Maryland Law Review, Vol. 55, 1993, pp. 1093, 1104-6; Robert L Nelson, “Ideology, Scholarship, 
and Sociolegal Change: Lessons from Galanter and the ‘Litigation Crisis’”, Law and Society Review, Vol. 21, 
No. 5, 1998, p. 677. For criticisms of lack of legal consciousness in Japan, see Haley, “The Myth of the 
Reluctant Litigant”, p. 359; Ramseyer and Nakazato, “The Rational Litigant…”, p. 263; West, Law in Everyday 
Japan…; Frank K. Upham, Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan, Harvard University Press, 1987.  
69 Sharyn Roach Anleu and Wilfred Prest, “Litigation: Historical and Contemporary Dimensions” in: Litigation: 
Past and Present, Sharyn Roach Anleu and Wilfred Prest (eds), UNSW Press, 2004, pp. 2-23; Peter Cane, 
“Reforming Tort Law in Australia: A Personal Perspective”, Melbourne University Law Review, Vol. 27, 2003, 
p. 649; Caspar Conde, “The Foresight Saga: Risk, Litigiousness and Negligence Law Reforms”, Policy, Vol. 20, 
No. 3, 2004, p. 28; Rob Davies, “Exploring the Litigation Explosion Myth”, Plaintiff, Vol. 49, 2002, p. 4; Rob 
Davies, “The Tort Law Crisis”, University of New South Wales Law Journal, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 865; Richard 
Refshauge, “Litigious Society’s Effect on the Public Sector”, Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration, Vol. 
105, 2002, p. 1; Ted Wright and Angela Melville, “Hey, But Who’s Counting? The Metrics and Politics of 
Trends in Civil Litigation” in: Litigation: Past and Present, Sharyn Roach Anleu and Wilfred Prest (eds), 
UNSW Press, 2004, pp. 96-121.  
70 See, for example, Kylie Burns, “Distorting the Law: Politics, Media and the Litigation Crisis: An Australian 
Perspective” Torts Law Journal, Vol. 15, 2007, p. 195; Bobette Wolski, “Reform of the Civil Justice System 
Two Decades Past — Implications for the Legal Profession and for Law Teachers”, Bond Law Review, Vol. 21, 
No. 3, 2009. pp. 192-5.   
71 Hayne, “Restricting Litigiousness”, p. 381. 
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theoretical and policy issues. As a starting point, most agree that a robust civil justice system 
is a pre-condition to upholding fundamental values shared by most modern liberal orders. 
Politically, it is essential to the rule of law: it defends freedom and democracy while, at the 
same time, it directs optimum behaviour73 in increasingly complex societies.74  Socially, the 
ability to invoke the law for rights-assertion is an “important symbol of active citizenship”.75 
Economically, it creates stability and predictability in defining and enforcing bargains and 
property rights, imperative for modern-day market-led economies.76 However, too much — 
or too little — litigation can risk the political, social and economic benefits of civil justice. 77 
This explains the emphasis in the litigiousness literature on the jurisdictions of the United 
States and Japan. Thus, in the United States the concern is whether Americans sue too readily. 
In Japan, it is that Japanese people are too reluctant to invoke the law to protect their rights.78  
 
So what is the basis for concern about the possible under-utilisation of the legal system by the 
Japanese? Consider the data. Currently, 30,516 lawyers serve a population of 127 million 
people, about 1 for every 4,000 citizens.79 Nearly 30% of Japan’s court districts have one 
lawyer (or none) practising in the region. Large commercial law firms (until recently) have 
been uncommon.80 With so few lawyers, litigation rates are very low. In the mid-1990s, for 
example, there were only 9.3 cases per 1,000 people in Japan compared to 123.2 cases in 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
72 John O. Haley, “Litigation in Japan: A New Look at Old Problems”, Williamette Journal of International Law 
& Dispute Resolution, Vol. 10, 2002, p. 121. 
73 Ibidem.  
74 Anleu and Prest, “Litigation”, p. 2; Kawashima, “Dispute Resolution ….”, p. 41. 
75 Margaret Thornton, “Citizenship, Race and Adjudication”, in: Judicial Power, Democracy and Legal 
Positivism, Tom Campbell and Jeffrey Goldsworthy (eds), Ashgate, 2000, p. 337.  
76 Kanishka Jayasuriya, “Introduction: A Framework for Analysis of Legal Institutions in East Asia”, in: Law, 
Capitalism and Power in East Asia: The Rule of Law and Legal Institutions, Kanishka Jayasuriya (ed), 
Routledge, 1999, pp. 3-7.  
77 Hayne, “Restricting Litigiousness”, p. 381. 
78 Feldman, The Ritual of Rights in Japan, pp. 1-15; Haley, “Litigation in Japan…”, p. 121. 
79 “Too Many Lawyers in Japan, Says Ministry of Internal Affairs”, Majirox News (online), 23 April 2012 
http://www.majiroxnews.com/2012/04/23/too-many-lawyers-in-japan-says-ministry-of-internal-affairs/. 
80 Bruce Aronson, “The Brave New World of Lawyers in Japan”, Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 21, 
2007, p. 45.  
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Germany, 74.5 in the United States 64.4 in the United Kingdom and 40.3 in France.81 Even 
by Asian standards, this rate is low. Based on statistics for new civil cases filed for trial in 
district courts in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in 1995-1996, South Korea had five times 
as many filings and Taiwan about twice as many.82 Some commentators are claiming that 
litigation rates are steadily increasing, especially since the beginning of the 21st century.83 
However, others explain that most of the increase is attributable to the surge in expedited debt 
recovery cases following the bursting of the economic bubble; ordinary contested cases — a 
better barometer of litigiousness — still remain at relatively low levels.84  
 
Why is litigation so much lower in Japan compared to other modern democratic economies? 
One of the more popular explanations is the cultural model of Japanese civil justice. This 
model attributes low levels of litigation to Japanese national traits of harmony and 
groupism.85 As far back as the 1960s, Japanese socio-legal scholar Takeyoshi Kawashima 
argued that Japanese pre-modern’ culture meant a low demand for legal professional services. 
As Japan modernises, Kawashima predicted, more Japanese would eventually accept 
litigation as a means to resolve their disputes.86 Several scholars have endorsed Kawashima’s 
thesis, although with different normative conclusions. For example, Chin and Lawson87 agree 
that Japanese are culturally averse to law. Japanese attitudes to law have been shaped 
geographic isolation, ethnic homogeneity and religious thought. Instead of law, the authors 
submit, non-legal forces ensure social order. Like Kawashima, the authors suggest that only 
social change will bring about a change of legal consciousness; but, whether change happens 
                                                            
81 Iwao Sato, “Judicial Reform in Japan in the 1990s: Increase of the Legal Profession, Reinforcement of 
Judicial Functions and Expansion of the Rule of Law”, Social Science Japan Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2002, p. 71. 
82 Haley, “Litigation in Japan …”, p. 124. 
83 Ginsburg and Hoetker, “The Unreluctant Litigant? …”, p. 31. 
84 Tanase, Community and the Law …, p. 158.  
85 Port, “The Case for Teaching Japanese Law …”, pp. 659-670. 
86 Kawashima, “Dispute Resolution …”, p. 41. 
87 Kim and Lawson, “The Law of the Subtle Mind …”, p. 461. 
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or not, they evaluate Japanese attitudes to law quite positively as “law of the subtle mind”. By 
contrast, Inoue assesses Japanese legal culture more darkly. The communitarian ethic — 
which carries with it an aversion to the individualism of rights-talk — carries real social costs, 
Inoue warns.88  
 
Comparative law researchers have strongly criticised the cultural model and offered 
alternative explanations. One of the first counter-explanations stresses institutional factors 
over cultural attributes. Specifically, this model points to a number of institutional 
disincentives in the legal system which deter litigation.89 For example, Hayley, while 
acknowledging that Japanese file proportionately fewer civil suits compared to citizens in 
other industrialised countries, points to evidence that the Japanese are not reticent about 
asserting their legal rights. Rather, institutional incapacity — few lawyers and judges, 
discontinuous nature of trials, and an inadequate range of remedies and enforcement powers 
— sets up a barrier to bringing suit in Japan.90 Other institutional barriers include a lack of 
pre-trial discovery procedures, high contingency fees, prohibitive court costs and the absence 
of a jury system.91 
 
Yet another counter-explanation is that the Japanese civil justice system is politically 
manipulated. Under this view, political elites — notably, the bureaucracy — manage the pace 
and direction of social change by channelling disputes away from the courts and into the 
hands of government-annexed informal dispute resolution facilities. Adherents of this view 
                                                            
88 Inoue, “The Poverty of Rights-Blind Communality …”, p. 517.  
89 Port, “The Case for Teaching Japanese Law …”, pp. 659-670. 
90 Haley, “The Myth …”, p. 359. 
91 Nobutoshi Yamanouchi and Samuel J. Cohen, “Understanding the Incidence of Litigation in Japan: A 
Structural Analysis”, Southern University Law Review, Vol. 17, 1990, p. 171. Japan introduced a quasi-jury 
system in 2009; however, this is more accurately described as a ‘lay judge’ system where citizens join 
professional judges in deciding questions of fact and law and, at any rate, is restricted to serious criminal 
matters: see Douglas G Levin, “Saiban-in Seido: Lost in Translation? How the Source of Power Underlying 
Japan’s Proposed Lay Assessor System May Determine its Fate”, Asia-Pacific Law & Policy Journal, Vol. 10, 
No. 1, 2011, p. 199.  
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submit that lower levels of litigation in Japan have nothing to do with a cultural aversion to 
law; it is more a result of deliberate conservative government policy.92 Japanese political 
conservatives prefer informal resolution of disputes because, it is submitted, they view 
litigation as a threat to the political and social status quo and, therefore, take calculated steps 
to discourage litigation.93 
 
A more controversial explanation for low litigation rates in Japan is advanced by economic 
rationalists. They advance economic rationales for Japanese litigating behaviour. Under this 
view, Japanese prefer to settle because damages verdicts are predictable and it is cheaper — 
or economically “rational” — to bargain in the shadow of the law rather than pursue litigation. 
A cultural aversion to law, argue economic rationalists, is pure myth.94 Ramseyer and 
Nakazato, for example, contend that the Japanese preference to settle cases out of court is not 
culturally pre-determined nor compelled by structural impediments in the legal system.95 
Japanese settle because they can predict what damages they might get if they pursued their 
dispute in court and, therefore, simply bargain “in the shadow of the law”. Settling is cheaper 
and quicker than pursuing a court case. This shows that the Japanese are bound by rationality, 
not culture, because they will maximise — not forsake — their self-interest. And it proves 
that the Japanese legal system works, because, if disputants are settling their disputes in light 
of expected litigated outcomes, then clearly law is structuring behaviour.96 Consider, for 
example, noise pollution from karaoke machines, a big problem in congested Japan.97 
According to case law databases, only about 40 disputes result in litigation brought before 
Japanese courts. By contrast, nearly 100,000 cases are heard each year by pollution complaint 
                                                            
92 Port, “The Case for Teaching Japanese Law….”, pp. 661-662, 669-670. 
93 Upham, Law and Social Change …, pp. 16-27, 124-165. 
94 Port, “The Case for Teaching Japanese Law …”, pp. 661-662, 668-669. 
95 Ramseyer and Nakazato, “The Rational Litigant …”, p. 263. 
96 Ibidem. 
97 West, Law in Everyday Japan …, pp. 90-91. See also Mark West, “The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative 
Actions in Japan and the United States”, Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 88, 1994, p. 1436. 
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counsellors, an informal dispute resolution service established by the Dispute Law. Under the 
law, counsellors have strong, judge-like powers to consult with residents, investigate 
pollution incidents, and provide guidance and advice. Filing a complaint involves no direct 
monetary cost, does not preclude filing a concurrent (or subsequent) law suit, and allows 
complaints to be heard and dealt with relatively swiftly due to the lack of formalities.  
 
LITIGIOUSNESS IN 21st JAPAN 
 
In 21st century Japan, policy-makers are engineering a new future for the Japanese civil 
justice system. This signals a new turn in the litigiousness debate, now less about why 
litigation rates remain low and more about whether or not Japanese society should embrace 
more litigation. Indeed, this is not so much a debate but a fait accompli. The Japanese 
government has accepted that more lawyers, more litigation — that is a more robust civil 
justice system — is key to Japan’s economic recovery. So much is clear from the 2001 report 
by the Justice System Reform Council (“Recommendations of the Justice System Reform 
Council — For a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century, the Justice System 
Reform Council”). In the opening chapter, for example, the Report highlights Japan’s 
“difficult conditions”, especially in the management of the political economy, and the need to 
restore “rich creativity and vitality to this country.” The Report goes on to suggest that state-
based economic planning must give way to a more participatory market economy built on 
open and transparent rules. “The justice system,” the Report submits, “should be positioned 
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as the ‘final linchpin’ of a series of various reforms concerning restructuring of the shape of 
our country.”98 
 
Lawyer numbers and legal education are strongly positioned within this agenda to kick-start 
economic growth through law. The objective is obvious: to expand the pool of talent capable 
of working through the complexities wrought by Japan’s integration into a global economic 
order. Thus, the proposals envision a more rigorous training in law in graduate law schools, 
as opposed to the current system of undergraduate interdisciplinary education in politics, 
economics, languages and law. Graduates of law schools would then sit for a revised bar 
examination and substantially more — as many as 70-80% although numbers are currently 
capped closer to 30% — would be allowed to pass. The Legal Research and Training Institute, 
the legal training arm of the Supreme Court of Japan, would grow in institutional capacity to 
groom those successful in the bar examination for careers in private practice, the judiciary or 
the procuracy. The end result — an expanded population of technical experts proficient in the 
art of complex problem-solving. 
 
This cuts against prevailing orthodoxy. Most economists argue that lawyers inhibit economic 
growth. Indeed, empirical studies have shown an inverse relationship between the number of 
lawyers and the vibrancy of the economy. Lawyers, many economists conclude, are a drag on 
the economy. Unlike entrepreneurs and engineers, lawyers do not generate wealth; they are 
rent-seekers who contribute complexity and other costs to completing transactions.99  
                                                            
98 For a summary of the Justice System Reform Council report, see Daniel H. Foote, “Introduction and 
Overview: Japanese Law at a Turning Point”, in: Law in Japan: A Turning Point, Daniel H Foote (ed), 
University of Washington Press, 2007, p. xix. 
99 Milhaupt and West, “Law’s Dominion …”, p. 451. 
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At any rate, this new government policy is having an effect. There is now empirical evidence 
of the “unreluctant” Japanese litigant.100 With a struggling economy and greater political 
competition, Japanese seem to be more prepared to fight for their slice of a shrinking pie. 
Government policies aimed at liberalising the economy and the legal system are facilitating 
access to the judicial system.101 The modern conception of law, premised on conceptions of 
party autonomy and universally applicable objective legal standards, is challenging the 
traditional Japanese orthodoxy of communitarianism.102  
 
WHY POPULR CULTURE? 
 
Quantitative data, however, only tell part of the story. For one, reliable statistics on litigation 
in Japan (or, indeed, elsewhere) are hard to come by and even more difficult to compare 
meaningfully across time or jurisdictions.103 For example, it is an open question whether 
litigiousness is indicated by simply filing legal proceedings, proceeding to trial or concluding 
a dispute with a final judgment.104 Further, “variations in institutional conditions, including 
court and professional structures, procedural and substantive rules, as well as recording 
practices, make it extremely difficult to compare litigation rates across national boundaries in 
a valid and meaningful fashion.”105 More fundamentally, quantitative data cannot answer 
qualitative questions. Litigiousness, after all, is a socio-cultural issue; it interrogates the 
extent to which people are conscious of the law and prepared to engage formal legal 
processes. Thus, a litigiousness people are those who frame their disputes in legal, adversarial 
                                                            
100 Ginsburg and Hoetker, “The Unreluctant Litigant? …”, p. 31. 
101 Ibidem.  
102 Tanase, Community and the Law … 
103 Anleu and Prest, “Litigation”, pp. 8-10.  
104 Ibid, p. 6. 
105 Ibid, p. 8.  
  19
terms; non-litigious people are those who prefer to resolve their complaints through informal 
means, such as negotiations or discussions, because they prefer to preserve rather than 
rupture relationships.  
 
Enter popular culture. Japanese popular culture is, I submit, a useful — yet under-developed 
— methodological tool for illuminating law’s functions in Japanese society, especially the 
issue of Japanese litigiousness. Yet despite the growing body of work in the interdisciplinary 
connections between law and popular culture,106 popular culture studies in the legal academy 
have not fully tapped this socio-legal potential. First, popular culture remains marginalised in 
a legal academy where the “hegemony” of black-letter doctrinal analysis still anchors legal 
education and research.107 Second, where legal scholars have engaged with popular culture, 
they have largely employed humanities-style textual analysis — focusing on the semiotic,108 
ideological109 or jurisprudential110 messages embedded in its texts — and largely ignored its 
socio-cultural potential for capturing citizens’ perspectives on the desirability of invoking 
formal law to frame rights and settle disputes.111  
 
At first blush, law and popular culture seem poles apart. As Kamir notes, law is a system of 
power; popular culture is an industry of pleasure: “Law is an authoritative, normative, 
                                                            
106 For a recent literature review, see Douglas J Goodman, “Approaches to Law and Popular Culture”, Law & 
Social Inquiry, Vol. 31, No. 7, 2006, p. 757. 
107 Steve Greenfield and Guy Osborn, “Law, Legal Education and Popular Culture:, in: Readings in Law and 
Popular Culture, Steve Greenfield and Guy Osborn (eds), Routledge, 2006, pp. 1-3.  
108 Goodman, “Approaches …”, pp. 758-74. 
109 Mezey and Niles, “Screening the Law …”, p. 91. 
110 William P. MacNeil, Lex Populi: The Jurisprudence of Popular Culture, Stanford University Press, 2007, p. 
5. 
111 For an excellent analysis of the socio-legal relevance of popular culture, see Friedman, “Law, Lawyers, and 
Popular Culture”, p. 1579.  
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centralistic, coercive system; film a world of amusing, escapist, emotionally gratifying 
popular-cultural artifacts.”112 Yet both share a narrative tradition:113  
 
As societal discourses, law and film both create meaning through storytelling, performance 
and ritualistic patterning, envisioning, and constructing human subjects, social groups, 
individuals, and worlds. Indeed, both discourses are extraordinarily powerful. Law and film 
both discursively constitute "imagined communities," to use Benedict Anderson's term. Each 
invites participants-viewers, legal professionals, parties to legal proceedings, and/or members 
of the public-to share its vision, logic, rhetoric, and values. Law and film both demand 
adherence to rules and norms in exchange for order, stability, security, and significance. Each 
facilitates – and requires – concomitant and continuous creation of personal and collective 
identity, language, memory, history, mythology, social roles, and a shared future. It thus 
stands to reason that an interdisciplinary approach to these two fields would offer lively and 
intriguing insights. 
 
The interdisciplinary potential of law and popular culture lies in this nexus of narratives. To 
be sure, stories are just that – stories. They are not empirical truth. In particular, popular 
culture is “entertainment and not social science.”114 American popular culture about the law, 
for example, exaggerates the extent of crime in the United States, over-represents murders 
and drug offences compared to more typical street crimes; glorifies lawyers as master 
advocates in court yet neglects their more mundane tasks (such as contract drafting); and 
ignores certain pre-trial processes (such as jury selection and interlocutory applications).115 
                                                            
112 Orit Kamir, “Honor and Dignity in the Film Unforgiven: Implications for Sociolegal Theory”, Law & Society 
Review, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2006, p. 207. 
113 Ibid, p. 208 
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Sports”, Law and Society Review, Vol. 21, 1987, p. 197. 
115 Ibid, pp. 197-9. 
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To achieve certain aesthetic effects, such as drama, comedy or horror, popular culture 
caricatures legal actors, processes and institutions.116 
 
But that misses the point. Stories matter to social scientists because they offer insights into 
how people understand and experience the world.117 As Cronon explains:118  
Narrators create plots from disordered experience, give reality a unity that neither nature nor 
the past possess so clearly. In so doing, we move well beyond nature into the intensely human 
realm of value. 
As such, narrative methods are more useful for constructivist research questions (what an 
experience means to subjects) rather than realist questions (what is the state of reality).119 
Narrators necessarily distort reality because they are making sense of, rather than reporting 
on, the real world.  
 
At the same time, the power of narrative analysis is said to come from the authenticity of 
respondents being empowered to tell their own stories in their own words.120 In the social 
sciences, data typically comes from oral sources, such as interviews,121 observations of 
conversations in self-help groups,122 oral histories and sermons;123 but written sources may 
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also reveal narratives, such as diaries,124 letters,125 trial transcripts126 and newspaper accounts. 
Is this authenticity lost when the narrator is not the ordinary person but the mass media 
industry and their stories are audio-visual materials? Put differently, is law-themed popular 
culture more indicative of the mass media’s view of the law than that of the general 
populations?127 A significant body of work in popular culture theory is concerned with the 
power of the mass media industry to transmit certain ideological messages to society.128 
According to this scholarship, the mass media does more than portray actual or idealised 
social conditions; it also contributes to acceptance of new social roles129 or an understanding 
of social processes.130    
 
Asimov and Mader131 provide an answer. The authenticity of popular culture lies in its 
verisimilitude – its ability to emotionally resonate with the audience to allow for the 
suspension of disbelief and to generate the desired affective response. The characters must be 
credible; the plots must replicate real lived experience; and the settings must be immediately 
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familiar. Further, as reader response theory acknowledges, audiences are not passive 
recipients but active “readers” in the interpretation of popular culture.132 An analysis of 
popular culture, therefore, must allow for multiple potential readings, given the heterogeneity 
of the interpretative community, and not simply privilege authorial intent.  
 
Popular culture, in short, is not a “mirror” of the actual operation of the law (a realist question) 
but a “window” into how people feel about it (a constructivist question).133 It taps into “a 
reservoir of mass mentality.”134 Yet, equally, since it is also a swirl of multiple and mixed 
interpretative possibilities, popular culture presents a range of possible affective states in a 
society; as such, its analysis does not lead us into the trap of essentialising or unifying a 
single national culture.135  
 
JAPANESE POPULAR CULTURE ABOUT THE LAW 
 
So what does Japanese popular culture about the law reveal about ordinary people’s feelings 
about the legal system? The data set here is a random selection of network television shows 
featuring lawyers, prosecutors, law students or legal processes, focusing in particular on those 
that have screened since the turn of the century. The analysis of the texts borrows from the 
narrative method, involving interpreting the messages embedded in the character portrayals, 
plot developments, settings, filming techniques and even background music. Necessarily, the 
data set is selective and the analytical approach is broad-brushed. But as an initial foray into 
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the interdisciplinary and socio-legal possibilities of law-and-popular culture, the purpose here 
is to sketch out thematic trends rather than paint a precise portrait.  
 
Prior to the 2000s, Japanese network television rarely resorted to lawyers as characters or 
court-rooms as dramatic settings. The popular dramas of the 1980s and 1990s, such as “3-
Nen B-Gumi Kinpachi-Sensei” (“Mr Kinpachi of Class 3B”) (TBS, seven series and 15 
made-for-TV movies, 1979-2011), “Oshin” (NHK, 1983-84), “Mama wa Aidoru” (“My 
Mother the Celebrity”) (TBS, 1987), “Tokyo Rabu Sutoorii”  (“Tokyo Love Story”) (Fuji 
Television, 1991) and “Rongu Bakeeshon” (“Long Vacation”) (Fuji Television 1996), were 
family sagas, coming-of-age stories or office-based romantic comedies. Law simply did not 
register in the popular imagination prior to the much-touted civil justice reforms in 2001.  
 
Law, however, was not completely absent. But in the few television shows that did portray 
lawyers or the courts, the representations were overwhelmingly unflattering. In the popular 
family drama “Kita no Kuni-kara” (“From a Northern Country”) (Fuji Television 1981-1982, 
with made-for-TV specials in 1983, 1984, 1987, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2002), the hero, 
unhappy with his life in Tokyo, takes his two young children, an eight-year old daughter and 
a ten-year old son, to his birthplace in the northern island of Hokkaido after his marriage 
breaks down. In episode four of the original series, the character of a lawyer makes a brief 
appearance. As the hero works happily on a farm, reminiscing happily with his co-workers 
about the “good old days”, the farm owner’s wife calls for the hero. With a look of noticeable 
concern on her face, she informs the hero that a guest has come for him. “A lawyer,” she 
whispers, and then adds hesitantly: “from Tokyo; a woman.”  She hands him the lawyer’s 
business card. The camera takes a close-up shot of the business card with “lawyer” marked 
prominently. The next scene is a lingering establishment shot of the female lawyer. She is 
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wearing a heavy fur coat, the urban wear of a successful professional, which is juxtaposed 
ironically with her standing among the lumber and dilapidated buildings of a small-town farm. 
As the camera moves to a close-up, her face is stern and heavily made-up; her hair is pulled 
tightly into a bun. The lawyer is thus painted as an interloper, an alien, an urbanite who 
stands uncomfortably among the more natural surroundings of the farm. This is reinforced in 
a conversation between the farm owner and his wife. “A lawyer form Tokyo?” the owner 
asks. “A woman,” replies his wife. “What does she want?” the husband muses. A shot of their 
faces show them wearing expressions of clear concern. Interestingly, the farmer’s wife seems 
to make much of the fact that the lawyer is a woman. In a telling contrast, the farmer’s wife 
plays a traditional nurturing role of wife and mother, a kind and gentle figure also beloved by 
the rest of the small-town community; the lawyer – incredulously, judging by the quizzical 
look on the farmer’s wife as she talks about her – plays against established gender 
expectations by appearing fierce and unpleasant. The message here is clear: law is a threat; 
law is not a nurturer; law runs contrary to traditional community norms.  
 
 “Shichinin no Onna Bengoshi” (“Seven Female Lawyers”), a show about an all-female law 
firm which ran for three seasons in the early 1990s before being remade for two additional 
seasons in the mid-2000s, makes slightly different, but equally negative, claims about 
Japanese law. In one episode in the first season, for example, one of the younger lawyers 
represents an accused rapist. The judge presiding over the trial is in his mid-fifties and with a 
short temper. To the defence lawyer’s increasing frustration, the judge seems to side with the 
prosecution, over-ruling all the defence’s objections to the admissibility of prosecution 
evidence. When the defence lawyer, barely able to control her rage, is about to stand and 
make another objection, she is controlled by her more senior colleague with a touch of her 
arm and a firm shake of her head. In the next scene, which takes place back at the law firm, 
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the senior colleague explains that the judge had recently served a term in the procuracy. This 
was a relatively common practice, she added. Rather than reflect on the policy objectives of 
rotating judges to the prosecutors’ office, private law firms or government departments, 
namely to expose them to other fields of legal practice, the characters in the story focus on 
the negative impact this has on the impartiality of the criminal justice system. As such, the 
show offers a withering criticism of the quality of Japanese justice.  
 
Fast-forward now to the 2000s. Legal dramas, once invisible, have gained in sufficient 
number to constitute a new genre in Japanese television. The heroes are lawyers (eg, “Riigaru 
Hai” (“Legal High”), 2012-13, Fuji Television), prosecutors (“Hero”, 2001, Fuji Television), 
legal trainees (“Beginaa”, (“Beginners”), 2003, Fuji Television) or judges (“Jajji” (“The 
Judge”), 2007, NHK); the settings are law firms (“Legal High”), prosecutor offices (“Hero”) 
or the Japan Legal Training and Research Institute (“Beginners”). Even light entertainment 
talk shows are drawing on law-themed skits and casting lawyers as celebrities (“Za Jajji” 
(“The Judge”), Fuji Television, 2001-2004) and “Gyouretsu no Dekiru Houristsu Soudansho” 
(“The Law Firm with the Long Queue”), Nihon Television, 2002-current.) 
 
Not has there been a quantitative increase in law-themed shows; there has been a noticeable 
qualitative difference in their narratives about the law. Law has become hip. Consider, for 
example, the titles of many law-themed shows. Either they use English (“Hero”) or 
Anglicised loan words (“Jajji”, “Beginaa”, “Riigaru Hai”), connoting something modern, 
trendy and “kuuru” (“cool”).136 The title sequence of “Hero” (2001, Fuji Television) makes 
this point abundantly clear. The hero is played by Takuya Kimura, a pop star and sex symbol. 
To amplify his status as trend-setter, the title sequence sees him dressed in a fashionable 
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leather jacket and jeans where his cast-mates, his colleagues in a Tokyo prosecutor’s office, 
wear dark suits and carry serious expressions. He appears in colour; his colleagues, in black-
and-white. The theme music is up-tempo and the sequence is captured in a series of stop-start 
takes. The preferred, cutting-edge career destination for young people, the show seems to 
suggest, is no longer the public service but the law.137  
 
The same idea is conveyed in “Beginaa” (“Beginners”), 2003, Fuji Television). The opening 
scene shows the young heroine making her way hesitantly into a large lecture theatre. A sub-
title appears making it clear that she is entering the Legal Research and Training Institute, an 
educational arm of the Supreme Court which prepares successful takers of the bar exam for a 
future career either in private practice, the judiciary or the procuracy. As she takes her seat 
while dreamy music plays in the background, there is a flashback to her days working as a 
pink-collar secretary in a busy work-office. The message is that her legal training is about to 
transform her life from the drudgery of office administration to a more exciting career in the 
law. To reinforce this message, the other key characters in the drama are identified in the 
opening few minutes of the first episode, all with their own flash-back stories: a violent thug, 
a high-profile bureaucrat ruined by a scandal, a spoilt rich girl, a bored house-wife, a 
retrenched worker in his mid-fifties, a hapless casual worker, a mobster’s mistress – all who 
have successfully sat for, and passed, the bar examination with the promise of beginning a 
new chapter in their lives. Law, in short, brings hope.   
 
Both “Hero” and “Beginaa” feature weekly episodes in which the law is championed as a tool 
to correct a social injustice. But in other television shows, the law is depicted as balancing 
competing, often immensurable, interests. In an episode from the second season of the 
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comedy “Riigaru Hai” (“Legal High”, 2013, Fuji Television), for example, a law firm is 
retained by a cartoonist and a blogger to defend them from defamation suits brought by a 
litigious business entrepreneur. The court room is the main theatre of action, with competing 
narratives about the right of privacy in the information age and the primacy of freedom of 
speech.  
 
In other shows, the law is openly mocked. A good example of this is the talk-show 
“Gyouretsu no Dekiru Houristsu Soudansho” (“The Law Firm with the Long Queue”), Nihon 
Television, 2002-current.) The show is skit-based light entertainment. Hosted by a comedian, 
a panel of celebrities (actors, singers, comedians and sports stars) discuss the various skits 
before the host turns to the four lawyers for their legal analysis. The skits are intended to be 
humorous, mostly because the scenarios are unlikely if not outright ridiculous. Examples 
include: a wife who, in her petition for divorce, seeks damages for the costs of a personal 
detective to uncover her soon-to-be-ex-husband’s acts of infidelity; a young woman whose 
broken-down car is fixed by a kindly stranger who later presents her with a mechanic’s repair 
bill; and an office worker who wants to stop her colleague, who claims to see ghosts, 
foretelling the failure of her future marriage. If one message from the entertainment industry 
is that law is a powerful and attractive tool to correct a social injustice, there is a counter-
narrative that law is not the answer when there is personal conflict in every-day life. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This brief survey of Japanese law-related popular culture offers some intriguing insights into 
Japanese feelings about the legal system. Certainly, based on the emergence of law as a new 
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genre in television, interest in the law is growing; equally, with strong narratives about the 
desirability of law as a career and its promise as a tool to protect the vulnerable, attitudes to 
the law are warming. This suggest a shift from an ambivalence about law and lawyers, most 
noticeable in the farmer wife’s reaction to the visiting lawyer from Tokyo in “Kita no Kuni-
kara”, to one that is open to engage with lawyers, legal careers and legal processes. This 
attitudinal shift might go some way to explaining the upswing in litigation rates since the turn 
of the century.  
 
At the same time, the embrace is a cautious one. As much as popular culture valorises the law 
as a tool to protect the weak, it criticises it if is allowed to infiltrate too deeply into everyday 
life and become the first point of call in inter-personal conflict. “Riigaru Hai”, for example,  
demonstrates that law cannot provide simple answers to life’s contentious political issues; 
and “Gyouretsu no Dekiru Houristsu Soudansho” illustrates that those who resort too readily 
to the law expose themselves to ridicule.  
 
The implications for the debate about Japanese litigiousness are mixed. The varied messages 
about law from popular culture, for example, do reinforce the criticism of cultural 
explanations of Japanese litigiousness insofar as socio-cultural attitudes are not fixed and 
universal but fluid, diverse and unfolding. At the same time, to the extent that counter-
explanations of Japanese litigiousness emphasise that litigation patterns are simply a rational 
response to the institutional environment, government policy or simply personal self-
maximising behaviour, they fail to capture how Japanese subjective perceptions about the law 
also seem to be changing.  
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This suggests, albeit tentatively, some new possible directions for future research into 
Japanese law and popular culture. As a matter of data and method, future research efforts 
could fruitfully expand the corpus of works subject to analysis, not only to other television 
shows not covered in this article but also to other media texts such as film, manga and anime. 
Second, as a matter of theory, litigiousness scholars need to explore a theoretical framework 
that marries the material and the culture (or, more precisely, the rational and the emotional) to 
develop a more convincing multi-factor analysis of Japanese litigiousness and legal 
consciousness.  
 
 
